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ABSTRACT 
Several game forms are given for implementing general social 
choice correspondences (SCC,' s) which satisfy Haskin' s conditions of 
monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy 
spaces than those used in previously discovered mechanisms: the 
strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of 
alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and 
political SCC's, including a-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl 
correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a 
vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice 
the dimension of the alternative space. 
1. 
GAME FORMS FOR NASH IMPLEMENTATION 
OF GENERAL SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES 
Richard D. McKelvey 
Introduction 
This paper provides some game forms for Nash implementation of 
general social choice correspondences. We give three different 
mechanisms, which are based on similar ideas as those used by Saijo 
(1985]. The mechanisms can be used to implement any social choice 
correspondence (SCC) involving three or more individuals which 
satisfies Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power, but we 
require smaller strategy spaces than are used in previous methods. 
We briefly review the existing literature in this area. Maskin 
(1977) first proved that a special type of monotonicity, referred to in 
the subsequent literature as "Maskin monotonicity", was a necessary 
condition for Nash implementability of a social choice function. 
Maskin further proposed a game form which could be used to implement an 
arbitrary social choice function which satisfied the additional 
condition of "No Veto Power". He also required at least three 
individuals, and a finite number of alternatives. His proof was 
incomplete, but a complete proof was subsequently provided by Williams 
[1984], who also relaxed the restriction of finiteness of the 
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alternative space to allow for infinite sets satisfying a certain 
condition. The Maskin and Williams theorems, however, require that the 
strategy spaces be quite large. Letting N be the set of individuals, A 
be the set of alternatives, and R � IT1€N R1 be the space of preference 
profiles, they require that individual strategy spaces be A X  R. Thus, 
each individual must report an alternative, together with a complete 
preference profile for the society. 
Subsequent research by Saijo (1985] investigated the question of 
whether the strategy space can be significantly reduced. Saijo 
provided a mechanism in which the strategy space for each individual is 
So, instead of reporting a complete profile, it 
suffices under Saijo's mechanism to report two preference orders and a 
player number. Saijo's mechanism also allows for arbitrary alternative 
sets (finite or infinite), The mechanism works on the principle of 
what we call a "Tweed ring"1: the individuals stand in a circle. The 
individual strategy spaces are designed so that each individual reports 
information that affects the feasible outcomes that can be achieved by 
his neighbor to the right. The payoff function for the game is then 
designed to make all reports consistent in equilibrium. In Saijo' s 
mechanism, the information reported is a preference order. Other 
authors have previously used versions of the Tweed ring in economic 
contexts (see e. g. , Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981] .) 
This paper is closely related to the work of Saijo, as we use a 
version of the Tweed ring that is similar in structure to his. We 
propose three mechanisms. For all three mechanisms presented here, the 
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strategy space for individual i is a subset of Ax 2 A  x 2 A  x N, where 
2 A  is the set of all subsets of A. Thus, instead of reporting two 
preference orders (which are each elements of 2 AXA), the individual 
reports subsets of A (which are each elements of 2A). In all of the 
mechanisms, the sets that are reported can be restricted to be valid 
lower contour sets for the individual and his neighbor under some 
preference profile in R, so the strategy space proposed here is always 
at least as small, and usually much smaller than that of Saijo. 
Depending on which of the mechanisms is used, and on what is known 
about the SCC, degenerate subsets of the basic strategy space can be 
used. If the set of feasible preference profiles is large enough, then 
N can be eliminated, so that the individual strategy space is a subset 
of A X  2 A  x 2A (Mechanism I'). If there is an alternative that is 
worst for everyone, regardless of the true preference profile, then one 
can use strategy sets of the form Ax 2A X N, or Ax 2 A  (Mechanisms II 
and II'), depending on the size of the set of feasible profiles, For 
SCCs satisfying a continuity requirement, the strategy space can be 
parameterized by the minimal preference profiles that give rise to 
specific alternatives (Mechanism III). In several common political and 
economic mechanisms (such as a-majority rule, and the constrained 
Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences), which are defined over 
continuous alternative spaces with concave preferences, these minimal 
profiles can be described by vectors. So, in this case the strategy 
space reduces to a set of the form Ax Ek, where Ek is Euclidian space 
of dimension k, and k is less than or equal to twice the dimension of A. 
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Finally, for the case where the alternative space is finite, and 
the space of preference profiles is large enough, we provide a 
mechanism which implements any implementable sec that satisfies 
unanimity (Mechanism III). As a corollary, it follows that in these 
circumstances, necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous SCC 
to be implementable are that it satisfy monotonicity and a weak version 
of No Veto Power. 
The results seem to suggest a reason why certain social choice 
correspondences can be implemented with much more economy in the size 
of the message space than others. The reason may be related to the 
number of parameters needed to describe the minimal profiles for a 
given sec. 
2 .  Notation and Definitions 
Let N = (1, 2 ,  .. . , n} be a set of individuals, and A be a set of 
alternatives. For each i € N, let R1 be a set of reflexive binary 
relations on A, and let R � Ili€N R1• A Social Choice Correspondence 
(SCC) is a correspondence F:R -+-+ A. Elements of R are denoted R 
(R1,R2, . .. , R,,), and are referred to as preference profiles, with R1 
denoting the preference relation of individual i € N. For any R1 € R1, 
and a € A, we write L(a, R1) = (x € A: aR1x} for the lower contour set 
of R1 about a. Note that we do not necessarily assume that R1 is 
transitive or complete. 
A game form is a pair (S, g), where S = IT1€N S1, and g:S �A. 
Elements of S are written s = (s1, • • .  , s0). For any s € S and j € N, 
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write s_J 
g(Sj , s-J) 
(s1, . . .  , sJ_1, 0, sJ+1, . . . , sn), and s =  (sJ, s-j ), and write 
{a' £ A: a' = g(s; , s_j ) for some s; £ SJ). Given any 
preference profile R R, a strategy n-tuple, s £ S is said to be a 
Nash Equilibrium for g if, for all i £ N, g(S1 , s_1) f L(g(s), R1). We 
write Ng(R) for the set of Nash equilibria for g under the preference 
profile R. 
The social choice correspondence F, is said to be Nash 
implementable if there exists a game form (S, g), such that F = g • Ng. 
I. e., for all R £ R, F(R) =g o Ng(R). In this case, we say that g 
implements F. 
We now define several conditions on social choice functions that 
are used in the proofs. 
Monotonicity: Let a £ A and R, R' £ R, satisfy a £ F(R) and L(a, R1) c 
L(a, R� ) for all i £ N, then a £  F(R'). 
No Veto Power (NVP): Let a E A  and R E  R satisfy, for some j E N, 
L(a, R1) =A for all i r< j, then a £  F(R). 
Unanimity (U): Let a £ A and R £ R satisfy L(a, R1) 
then a c F(R). 
A for all i c N, 
For any R c R, and a c A, we say R is F-minimal for a if a £  F(R), 
and for every R' c R with L(a, R; ) c L(a, RJ) for all j c N and L(a, R; ) 
r< L(a, RJ) for some j c N, we have a I F(R'). 
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Weak NVP (NVP'): Let a £ A and R £ R satisfy, for some j £ N, 
L(a, R1) = A for all i r< j. Assume 3 a' £ A and R' £ R with 
i) R' F-minimal for a'
ii) a c L(a' , R; ) f L(a, RJ). 
Then, a £  F(R). 
Clearly, NVP implies both NVP' and U. 
Maskin [1977] first proved that any Nash implementable social 
choice correspondence is monotonic. The proof is short, so we include 
it for completeness. 
Lemma 2 . 1: If F:R +->A is Nash implementable, then F is monotonic. 
Proof: Since F is implementable, there is a game form, (S, g), with F 
g 0 Ng. Let a E A, and R, R' £ R satisfy a E F(R) and L(a, R1) c 
L(a, R� ) for all i E N. Then, 3 s E S  with g(s) =a and s £  Ng(R).
I.e., g(S1 , s_1) C L(a, R� ) for all i £ N. But, since L(a, R1) f L(a, R� ). 
we have g(S1 , s_1) f L(a, R� ) for all i E N. I. e. , s E Ng(R'), and hence 
a c g • Ng(R) = F(R). 
Q.E.D. 
Under an additional assumption on the domain of preference 
profiles, we show that any implementable social choice correspondence 
satisfies NVP'. We say that R is complete if, for all a E A, all 
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j c N, all R c R, and all B c A with a c B, 3 R' c R with L(a,R; ) = B 
and L(a,R1) = L(a,R� ) for all i � j. Examples of complete preference 
domains would be the set of all profiles of weak orders on A, the set 
of all profiles of linear orders on A, or the set of all profiles of 
binary relations on A. 
Lemma 2 .2 :  I f  F:R -+--+ A is Nash implementable, and R is complete, then 
F satisfies NVP', 
Proof: Since F is implementable, 3 g: S �A with F(R) =g o Ns(R) for
all R € R. So, let R € R and a € A be such that, for some j € N, 
L(a,R1) =A for all i � j. Assume 3 a' c A and R' € R with (i) R' 
minimal for a', and (ii) a c L(a' ,R; ) f L(a,RJ). Then, by (i), 
a' c F(R'), so since g implements F, 3 s' c S with g(s') =a' and 
s' € Ng(R'). I.e., g(SJ ,s_; ) f L(a' ,R; ). But, since R is complete, 
and R' is minimal for a', it follows also that L(a' ,R; ) f g(SJ ,s_; ) . . 
If not, then find R" c R with L(a' ,R�') = g(SJ ,s_J), and L(a' ,R� ) = 
L(a' ,R� ) for all i � j. 
for all i c N. Thus, since g implements F, a' € F(R"). But this 
contradicts the fact that R' is minimal for a'. Thus, we have 
g(SJ ,s_ ; ) = L(a' ,R; ). But now, by (ii), we have a €  g(SJ ,s_; ). So, 3
s J c SJ with g ( s J , s _; ) 
= g(SJ ,s_; )� since s_J s_; . Hence, g(Sj ,s_j) = L(a' ,R; ) � L(a,Rj). 
But now, since for i � j, L(a,R1) =A, we have, for all i, g(S1 ,s_1) c 
L(a,R1). Hence, s c N8(R). So, since g implements F, we have a c 
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F(R). This proves NVP'. 
Q.E. D. 
3 ,  A General Game Form 
In this section, a general game form is presented, which 
implements any social choice function satisfying Maskin's conditions of 
monotonicity and No Veto Power. The strategy spaces required for each 
individual are to report an alternative, two subsets of the alternative 
space, and a player number. The game form is a modified version of 
Saijo's [1985] mechanism. However, whereas Saijo requires individual 
strategy spaces to include the report of two preference orders, the 
strategy space used here replaces these with two subsets of the 
alternatives. Otherwise, the basic structure of the mechanism is very 
similar to that of Saijo. In particular, we use the trick of Rule 2 to 
eliminate the possiblity of undesireable equilibrium when there is not 
enough agreement. Saijo attributes Rule 2 to an unidentified author. 
Similar ideas have also appeared in Postlewaite and Shmeidler [1984] 
and been used by Palfrey and Srivastava [1985], 
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the convention that 
any non negative integer appearing in a subscript is computed modulo n, 
and if the result is 0, it is set to be n. As before, negative 
integers appearing in subscripts refer to the n-1 tuple excluding the 
indicated individual. 
We begin by defining the strategy spaces of the game, (S,g): For 
any i € N, 
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S1 f A x 2A x 2A x N is any set satisfying: 
(3. 1) 
(3. 2) 
s = (s1, . . .  ,sn), respectively. As before, for any s E S, we write s_1 
(s1, . . .  ,s1 _1,0,si+l•···•sn) and s= (si,s-i). Finally, for any 
s c S, define 
Definition 3.1: For any s € s, and j c N, define s_j to be 
F-consist:ent: if 3 a* E A and R* c R with 
(i) a* E F(R*) 
(ii) ai = a* for all i € N - {j)
(iii) v i .,. j' Ai = L(a*,Rt), and Bi L(a*,R1 !1). 
MECHANISM I: Let S satisfy (3. 1) and (3. 2), !N I� 3, and for any 
s € S, let k(s) be defined by (3. 3). Define g : s �A by 
(3. 3) 
Rule 1: If 3 j € N with aj .,. aj-l• and if s_J is F-consistent, 
then 
g(s) 
�ule 2: Otherwise 
g(s) 
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Note that since !NI � 3, there can be at most one j E N which 
satisfies the conditions of Rule 1, so g(s) is well defined. 
Theorem 1: Let !NI � 3 and let F be any monotonic sec satisfying NVP. 
Then, the game form g, defined in Mechanism I, implements F. 
Proof: The proof is provided by Lemmas 3. 1 and 3.2. 
Lemma 3. 1: For all RE R, F(R) cg o N8(R). 
!'roof: Pick RE R, and let a e F(R). We must show a€ go N8(R). For 
all i E N, define Si = (a,L(a,Ri),L(a,Ri+1),l). Then, s = (s11 · · · ,sn) 
falls in Rule 2' and g(s) = � = a. 
I 
Further, for 
I I I I 
all j E N, s_j 
I F-consistent. Thus, given any sj = (aj ,Aj ,Bj, nj) € sj, either aj 
in which case Rule 2 applies, and g(s; ,s_j) 
in which case Rule 1 applies, so g(sj ',s_j) E (a,aj '} c Bj-l = 
a c g o N8 (R). 
Lemma 3. 2: Let jNj � 3 and let F be any monotonic social choice 
function satisfying NVP. For all R € R, go N8(R) f F(R). 
!'roof: Pick RE R, and assume a Ego N8(R). Then 3 s ES with 
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is 
= a, 
Q.E.D. 
s e Ng(R) and a= g(s). We must show a e F(R). We first establish two 
properties of s: 
(Pl) For all j e N, if s_j is not F-consistent, then L(a,RJ) A. 
(P2) For all j e N, Bj-l S L(a,Rj). 
To prove (Pl), note that if s_J is not F-consistent, then 
g(Sj ,s_J) =A. In particular, to achieve a' e A, set a; =a' , B; = �. 
and pick n; so that liFJ n1 + n; (mod n) = j. Now, pick A; so s;= 
(a; ,AJ ,B; ,n;) e SJ. It follows that s' (s; ,s_j) falls under Rule 2,
since s_� is F-consistent for no i e N. But k(s' ) = j, hence g(s' ) 
aj =a' . Since s e Ng(R), it follows that g(SJ ,s_j) S L(a,RJ). Thus, 
'L(a,RJ) = A. 
To prove (P2), first note that if s_J is not F-consistent, we can 
apply (Pl) to get the result. If s_J is F-consistent, then we show 
I I I I so sj = (aj ,Aj ,BJ ,nj) e SJ. If a' = aJ-l• Rule 2 applies, since 
a1 =a' for all i, and g(sJ ,s_J) =a' . If a' F aJ-l• then Rule 1 
applies, and g(s; ,s_J) =a; =a' . Since s e Ng(R), it follows BJ-l c 
L(a,RJ). 
To prove the lemma, we consider three cases: 
Case 1: For all j e N, s_j is not F-consistent. 
By (Pl), A= L(a,RJ) for all j. It follows by NVP that a e F(R). 
Qase 2: For some j e N, s_J is F-consistent, and s-(j+l) is not. 
Note that in this case a1 = aJ-l for all i F j. Now if a F aj-l• 
then we must have a= aJ F aJ-l• and for all i F j, s_1 is not 
F-consistent. Hence, by (Pl), L(a,R1 ) =A for all i e N - (j). By 
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NVP, a e F(R). So, we may assume a= aj-l· But then, since s_j is 
F-consistent, 3 R* e R with a e F(R*), and Bi 
i F j. By (P2), L(a,Rt) C L(a,R1 ) for all i F j + 1. But, by 
assumption, s-(j+l) is not consistent. So, by (Pl), L(a,R1+1) 
Hence, we get L(a,Rf) S L(a,R1 ) for all i e N. By monotonicity, 
a e F(R). 
Case 3: For all j e N, s_j is F-consistent. 
A. 
Here, a1 =a for all i, and B1 = A1 +1 for all i e N. Consequently, 
since s_J is F-consistent for some j e N, 3 R* e R with a e F(R*), and 
with B1 = L(a,R1 !1) for all i F j, and with Aj+l � L(a,Rj!1). But, 
L(a,R1 !1) for all i. By (P2), we get 
L(a,Rf) S L(a,R1 ) for all i. By monotonicity, a e F(R). 
Q.E.D. 
We make a few final comments on the differences between Theorem 1 
and Saijo' s results. Saijo requires two additional conditions in his 
proofs. Specifically, he requires that the domain of preference 
profiles satisfy the coordinate property (i. e., R = Il1eN R1), and also 
that the domain of preferences consist of weak orders. Neither of 
those conditions are required in Theorem 1. 
The inclusion of the possibility that A1 B1 = � in the 
definition of the strategy spaces for Mechanism I is simply to make the 
proof easier. This can be eliminated, and the theorem is still true 
under the conditions assumed by Saijo, but then a different argument is 
needed to deal with the case of !NI � 4 and jAI � 3. With this 
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proviso, it should be noted that the strategy space for Mechanism I is 
always at least as small as that of Saijo [1985], and usually much 
smaller. 
If the set of profiles which can give rise to any given 
alternative is always large enough, then we can eliminate the set N 
from the strategy space: For any a€ A and i € N, define Li(a) = 
(L(a,Ri)}R ER· Now, if ILi(a)I 2 n for all a EA, and i € N, then we 
. can define a function n1 : Ax 2A � N.with ni(a,L1 (a)) = N for all 
a € A, iE N. Now, for each i € N, set 
Si 2 A x 2A x 2A to be any set satisfying 
For any s € S, define 
k(s) 
(3. 1)' 
(3. 2)' 
(3. 3)' 
Then, define Mechanism I' in exactly the same·manner as in Mechanism I, 
except replace (3.1)-(3.3) by (3. l)'-(3. 3)', respectively. 
Theorem l': Let jNj 2 3, and let F be any monotonic sec satisfying 
NVP. Assume j (L(a,R1 )}R ERI 2 n for all i €N and a€ A. Then, 
Mechanism I' implements F. 
Proof: Deleting the ni 's from the strategies, the proof follows 
exactly the lines of Theorem 1, except in the proof of property Pl. 
Proof of (Pl): We prove that g(Sj ,s_J) =A. From the assumption that 
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l (L(a,Ri)}R ERI 2 n for all i € N, it follows that !al 2 3. Write A(s) 
= (ai: 
and so 
pick A; 
i;.< 
j}. To achieve a' 
that IA(s) u 
so that liFj 
(a"l I 2 3 
ni (a1 ,Ai) 
€ A, pick a" € A so that 
unless IA(s) I 1. Set 
+ nJ (a" ,A;) = k (mod n), 
chosen with either ak = a' or a; = a'. Pick B; so s; 
a' € A(s) u (a"} 
I au, and aj 
where k is 
Sj. Then, s' = (s; ,s_j) falls under Rule 2, since s_1 is F-consistent 
for no i € N. But, k(s') = k, so g(s') =a' . 
Q.E.D. 
4. The Holocaust Mechanism 
It is possible to achieve some strategy space reduction if there 
are restrictions on the feasible preference profiles. In this section 
we assume that there is some alternative which is unconditionally worst 
for everybody, and give a mechanism which can implement any SCC 
satisfying monotonicity and NVP. The strategy space of an individual 
consists of an alternative, a subset of the alternatives, and a player 
number. It is smaller than that in Mechanism I in that it requires 
only one, instead of two sets be reported. 
We assume there exists an alternative, aH €A, with aH I F( R), 
such that for all R E  R, and all a€ A- (aH}, a I L(aH,R1 ) and 
aH € L(a,R1 ) for all i € N. The alternative aH is called the 
holocaust. Note that the existence of aH implies that IAI 2 2. 
We define the strategy spaces and payoff function of the game 
(S,g): 
S1 c Ax 2A x N is defined as: 
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(4. 1) 
(4. 2) 
(s1, • . .  , sn), respectively. For any s € S, define 
k(s) = li€ N ni (mod n) (4.3) 
MECHANISM II: Let S satisfy (4. 1) and (4. 2), N � 3, and for any s € S, 
let k(s) be defined by (4.3). Define g:S 4 A by: 
Rule 1: 3 a* € A such that V i € N, ai a*. Then, 
(i) If 3 R* € R s. t. a*€ F(R*), and Vi€ N, A1 = L(a*, R1 �1), 
g(s) = a* 
(ii) Otherwise, 
g(s) = aH 
gule 2: 3 a*€ A and 3 j € N such that Vi€ N- (j), 
g(s) 
Rule 3: Otherwise, set 
{ aJ if aj € AJ _ 1 - { a8 ) or a* 
a* otherwise 
g(s) = ak ( s ) 
Theorem 2: Let ! N I � 3, let A contain a holocaust, and let F be any 
monotonic SCC satisfying NVP. Then, the game form g, defined in 
Mechanism II, implements F. 
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Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. 
Lemma 4. 1: For all R € R, F(R) cg 0 Ns(R). 
froof: Let a€ F(R). Then, for all i € N, define si = 
(a, L(a, Ri +1), i). Clearly, s falls under Rule 1 (i), and hence g(s) = 
a, But also, s is a Nash Equilibrium, because for any i € N, consider 
s: � s1 . Then, if a: � a, s' = (s: , s_1 )  falls in Rule 2, and hence 
g(s') € Ai+l = L(a, Ri). On the other hand, if a: =a, then s '  falls in 
Rule 1, in which case g(s') € {a, aal c L(a, Ri ). Hence, for all 
s� € Si, g(s: , s_1 )  € L(a, R1 ) = L(g(s), R1 ), so s€ Ng(R). Thus,
a€ go Ng(R), and we have shown F(R) cg o Ng(R) 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4.2: Let ! N I � 3, and let F be monotonic and satisfy NVP, then 
for all R € R, go Ng(R) c F(R). 
froof: Pick R € R, and let a€ go Ng(R). Then, since a€ g 0 N8(R), 
it follows that 3s € S with g(s) =a and s€ N8(R). We must show 
a€ F(R). Now, s could fall under any of the three rules. We consider 
each in turn. 
Rule 1: For some a* € A, a1 = a* for all i € N. 
Consider first, subcase (i). Then, a a*, and 3R* € R with 
F(R*) =a and with A1 _1 = L(a, Rt) for all i € N. But then, we show for 
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all i, Ai-l - {a8 ) S g(Si,s-i). In particular, to achieve a' € Ai-l -
(a8 ), set a�= a' , and pick A� so s�= (a�,A�,ni) €Si. Then, 
g(s�,s-i) a' . Now, using s € N8(R), we must have L(a,Rt) - (a8 ) 
Ai-l - (a8 ) S g(Si,s-i) S L(a,Ri) for all i € N. But, since 
a8 € L(a,Ri), it follows L(a,Rt) S L(a,Ri) for all i € N. But then, 
by monotonicity, since a e F(R*), we must have a e F(R). 
Next, consider subcase (ii). Here, a= g(s) = a8 . Pick any a' €A 
with a' Fa*, and pick any i € N. Pick A� with s�= (a' ,A' i,ni) €Si. 
Then, s' = (s�,s-i) falls in Rule 2 .  So, g(s' ) F a8 • Hence, g(s�,s-i) 
I L(a,Ri) = (a8 ). So, s I N8(R), a contradiction. 
�ule 2 :  Here, 3j e N and a*€ A with ai =a* F aj for all i F j. So, 
IAI � 2 .  By Rule 2 ,  a= g(s) e {aj ,a*), and g(s) F a8 . We show that 
for any i F j, A - {a8 ) S g(Si,s-i). If IA I = 2 ,  then since g(s) F a8 , 
we get A - {a8 ) = {g(s)) S g(Si,s-i). If IAI > 2 ,  then to achieve any 
a" e A - {a8 ), pick a' e A so that a' I {aj ,a*) and so that 
a" e {aJ,a*,a' ). Then, pick A{ so si' = (a' ,A�,n�) €Si. Then, Rule 3 
applies, and n� can be chosen so that g(s�,s-i) is any element in 
{ aj , a*, a' ), in particular, a". Thus, for all i F j, since s e N8 (R), 
we have A - {a8 ) S g(Si ,s_i) S L(a,Ri). But, since a8 e L(a,Ri) for all 
i F j, it follows that L(a,Ri) =A for all i F j. By NVP, we have 
a€ F(R). 
Rule 3 :  Here, by the same argument as the latter part of Rule 2 ,  we 
have L(g(s),Ri) =A for all i e N, implying a e F(R). 
Q. E. D. 
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Just as in Mechanism I, we can delete N from the strategy space 
if, for all a€ A and i e N, (L(a,Ri))R€R is large enough. Since the 
method is very similar to that used for Mechanism I, we just state the 
result, leaving the proof for the reader. 
Define ni: Ax 2 A  � N exactly as in Section 3 .  Then, for each 
i € N, set 
Si c A X 2 A  to be any set satisfying 
Si 2 [(ai,Ai): ai €A and 3R e R with Ai 
S = IIi rn S1 • 
For any s € S, define 
k(s) 
(4 .1)' 
(4. 2)' 
(4. 3)' 
Then, define Mechanism II' identically to Mechanism I, except 
replace (4.1)-(4.3 ) by (4.l)'-(4. 3 )', respectively. 
Theorem 2': Let INI � 3 ,  let A contain a holocaust, and let F be any 
monotonic sec satisfying NVP. Assume llL(a,Ri)l R€RI � n for all i € N 
and a € A. Then, Mechanism II' implements F. 
5. Strategy Space Reduction 
We return to the case where there is no holocaust alternative, and 
give a mechanism which is useful in reducing the size of the strategy 
space for certain SCCs. The mechanism is a modified version of 
Mechanism I, which has some advantages and disadvantages over that game 
form. 
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The primary advantage of the modified mechanism is that the 
strategy spaces are smaller than in Mechanism I. The reduction is 
quite dramatic for certain common social choice functions such as 
Walrasian, Lindahl, and a-majority rules defined over spaces of quasi 
concave preferences. In all these cases, the strategy spaces can be 
reduced to an alternative, a player number, and one or two (price) 
vectors. This yields mechanisms that are very similar to mechanisms 
that have been constructed by Hurwicz [1979], and others for use in 
economic contexts. The mechanism presented here has the advantage that 
it always produces feasible outcomes, even out of equilibrium, although 
it is not completely "decentralized", as it requires individuals to 
know the feasible set for the whole society. 
A second advantage of the modified mechanism is that it implements 
a wider class of SCCs than Mechanism I. The SCC need only satisfy U 
and NVP' rather than NVP. For the case of complete preferences over 
finite sets, the mechanism implements all implementable secs satisfying 
unanimity (U). As a corollary, in this case we find that necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a unanimous SCC to be implementable are that 
it satisfy NVP' and monotonicity. 
One disadvantage of the revised mechanism is that it requires an 
additional restriction on the SCC. The condition is a type of 
"closedness", requiring that for every alternative and every profile 
yielding that alternative as a social choice, there must be an 
F-minimal profile yielding the same alternative, with lower contour 
sets contained in those of the given profile. Any SCC defined on a 
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finite set of alternatives, as well as many common examples of economic 
and political secs, satisfy this condition. 
A second disadvantage of the revised mechanism is that it is not 
"direct". In Mechanism I, there is an equilibrium in which individuals 
reveal truthfully attributes of themselves and their neighbors. 
Namely, they reveal their own and their neighbor's correct lower 
contour sets. In the revised mechanism, the equilibrium strategies are 
not quite so natural. 
We first need to define the additional condition on the SCC that 
is needed. We say that the SCC, F: R-+-> A, satisfies F-closedness if, 
for all a <  A and R E  R with a <  F(R), there is an R' < R, with L(a,R; ) 
� L(a,R1) for all i < N, such that R' is F-minimal for a. 
We define the strategy spaces and the payoff function of the 
modified game form, (S,g), as follows: 
S1 S A x 2A x 2A x N is any set satisfying 
S1 2 {(a1 ,A1 ,B1 ,n1): a1 € A, n1 € N, and 3 R < R which is F-1i1inimal 
for a1 with either A1 L(a1,R1) and B1 
L(a1,R1+1) or A1 = L(a1,R1) and Bi =�} (5. 1) 
S = II1rn S1 (5. 2) 
Typical elements of Si and S are denoted si = (a1,Ai,Bi ,n1) and s 
(s1, .. . ,sn), respectively. Again, for any s < S, set 
k(s) = L <N n1 (mod n) (5. 3) 
Qefinition 5.1: For any s € S, and j < N, define s_j to be minimally 
F-consiscenc if 3 a* < A and R* < R satisfying: 
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(i) R* is F-minimal for a* 
(ii) I/ i "" j, a1 a* 
(iii) I/ i ,_,, j , A1 L(a*,Rf), and B1 
MECHANISM III: Let S satisfy (5.1) and (5.2), INI 2 3, and for any s c 
S, let k(s) be defined by (5.3). Define g:S �A by: 
Rule 1: If 3 j c N with aj ,_,, aj-l• and if s_j is minimally 
F-consistent, then 
{ aj if aj c Bj -l 
g(s) = 
aJ _ 1 otherwise 
�ule 2: Otherwise, 
g(s) = ak ( s )
Note that there can be at most one j c N which satisfies the 
conditions of Rule 1, so g(s) is well defined. 
Theorem 3: Let INI 2 3 and let F be any F-closed monotonic sec 
satisfying NVP' and U. Then, the game form g, defined in 
Mechanism III, implements F. 
Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas 5,1 and 5.2. 
Lemma 5.1: Let F satisfy F-closedness and monotonicity. Then for all 
R c R, F(R) �go Ng(R). 
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Proof: Pick R c R, and let a c F(R). We must show a cg o N8(R). 
Pick R* c R with R* F-minimal for a, and L(a,�*) � L(a,� ) for all i c 
N. For all i c N, define s1 = (a,L(a,Rf),L(a,R1i1),l). Then s= 
(s1, • • •  ,sn) falls in Rule 2, and g(s) =� =a. Further, for all j c 
N, s_J is F-consistent. 
t either aj a, in which case Rule 2 applies, and g(s; ,s_j) =a c 
L(a,RJ), or a;"" a, in which case Rule 1 applies, so g(s; ,s_j) c {a,a;} 
L(a,Rf) � L(a,RJ). Thus, g(Sj,s-j) � L(a,Rj), which shows 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5.2: Let INI 2 3 and let F be any F-closed, monotonic social 
choice function satisfying U and NVP'. For all R c R, go N8(R) � F(R). 
froof: Replacing "minimal F-consistency" for "F-consistency", the 
proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 3.2, except for case 1 
and case 2. So we just present that portion of the proof. 
Case 1: For all j c N, s_j is not minimally F-consistent. 
By (Pl), A= L(a,Rj) for all j. It follows by unanimity that 
a c F(R). 
Case 2: For some j c N, s_j is minimally F-consistent, and S-(J+l) is 
not. 
In this case, a1 = aj _1 for all i "" j. If a "" aj _1, then we must 
have a = aJ ,_,, aj _1, and for all i""j, s_1 is not minimally 
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F-consistent. Hence, by (Pl), L(a, Ri) =A for all i � j. Further, 
since s_J is minimally F-consistent, 3 R* < R and a* aJ-l <A with R* 
minimal for for a*. By P2, BJ-l = L(a*, R*J) S L(a, RJ), and by Rule 1 a 
< BJ-l = L(a*, R*J). The conditions of NVP' are satisfied, so a<
F(R). So we may assume a= aJ-l· The remainder of the proof of this 
case is exactly as before. 
Q.E.D. 
In Mechanism III, as in Mechanisms I and II, we can delete N from 
the strategy space when the set of profiles is large enough. Define 
R(a) to be the set of profiles in R which are F-minimal for a. Then, 
let Li(a) = (L(a, Ri)lRcR(a)· If jLi(a)j 2 n for all a< A and i < N, 
then, define ni: AX 2 A � N with ni(a, Li(a)) = N for all a< A, i € N. 
Now, for each i < N, set 
Si c A x 2 A x 2 A is any set satisfying 
Si 2 ( (ai, Ai, Bi): ai <A, and 3 R < R(a) with Ai= L(ai, Ri) and 
Bi L(ai , Ri+1), or Ai= L(ai, Ri) and Bi =�) 
(5.1)' 
S = Ili<N Si. (5.2)' 
For any s < S, define 
k(s) (5.3)' 
Then, define Mechanism III' in exactly the same manner as Mechanism 
III, except replace (5.1)-(5.3) by (5.l)' -(5.3)' , respectively. 
Theorem 3' : Let INI 2 3, and let F be any F-closed, monotomic sec
satisfying NVP' and U. Assume llL(a, Ri))R<R(a)I 2 n for all i € N and 
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a € A. Then, Mechanism III' implements F. 
Proof: The changes to the proof of Theorem 3 are exactly the same as 
those made in Theorem l' to Theorem 1. 
Q.E.D. 
Note that if F is onto (i.e., F( R) =A) and !Al 2 3, then the 
requirement that Bi = � be admissible in the definition of Si can be 
dropped, In this case, we can replace (5.1) by 
Si 2 ( (ai, Ai, Bi, ni): ai <A, ni < N, and 3 R < R(a) with 
(5.4) 
and Theorem 3 is still true. Similarly, in Mechanism III' , if F is 
onto, we can replace (5.1) by 
Si 2 ( (ai , Ai, Bi): ai <A, and 3 R < R(a) with 
(5.4)' 
and Theorem 3' is still true. The proofs just involve minor changes to 
the proof of property (Pl) in Theorems 3 and 3' , so we leave them for 
the reader. 
Finally, if !Al is finite, Theorem 3 yields the following 
characterization of implementable secs. 
Corollary 5.1: If R is complete, !Al is finite, and !NI 2 3, necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence satisfying 
U to be implementable are that it satisfy monotonicity and NVP'. 
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Proof: Since any SCC defined on a finite set always satisfies 
F-closedness, the result is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
6. Some Examples 
Q.E.D 
In this section, we give some examples showing how the theorems of
the previous section apply to give game forms for implementation of 
well known SCCs in political and economic settings. Sepcifically, we 
consider a-majority rule, the Walrasian correspondence and the Lindahl 
correspondence. In each case, we identify the minimal profiles giving 
rise to a given alternative, and then use these minimal profiles to 
construct strategy spaces satisfying the conditions of Mechanism III 
and III' . Since in all three cases, the minimal profiles can be 
described by vectors, it follows also that the strategy spaces can be 
parameterized by these vectors. Thus, all these SCCs can be 
implemented using message spaces consisting of an alternative and a 
vector (of dimension no more than twice the dimension of A). 
These results are not new. At least for the Walrasian and Lindahl 
cases, other researchers have already constructed mechanisms whose 
message spaces are on the order of magnitude of those given here (see, 
e.g., Hurwicz (1979]). Nevertheless, the results are of interest for 
two reasons. First, since the methods used here can be applied to any 
sec, they provide a technique for constructing a game form, with 
"small" strategy spaces, for an arbitrary SCC. Secondly, the results 
do suggest a reason why certain SCCs can be implemented with smaller 
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message spaces than others. We conjecture that the minimum size of the 
message space required to implement a given SCC may be related to this 
number of parameters needed to pararmeterize the minimal profiles of 
the sec.
Example 1: a-majority rule. 
Let A S E0 be compact and convex, R1 = IR1 S A X A: R1 has a 
pseudoconcave utility representation) , and R = Ili EN R1. For any RE R, 
and a, a' E A, define 
v(a, a' , R) =I ii E N: a' I L(a, R1)Jj, 
v(a, R) maxa'EA v(a, a' , R). 
Then, for any 0 5 a 5 1, define the SCC, Fa:R-+-> A by 
Fa(R) =la E A: v(a, R) 5 an) . 
Greenberg (1979] has shown, if a> n·[m / (m+l)], that Fa is always 
non-empty. It also follows easily that Fa satisfies monotonicity and 
NVP. So Mechanism I can be used to implement Fa· However, Mechanism 
III can yield substantial strategy space reduction. For any a E A, and 
q E Em, write H(a, q) =la' E A: a' · q 5 a · q) . For any p 
(p1, • • . , p0) E (Em)n, write IP I = maxa'EA I ii E N: a' I H(a, p1)l l . 
Then, it can be verified that Fa is F-closed, and that for any a E A, R 
E R  is F-minimal for a only if 3 p E (Em)n, with IPI 5 a, satisfying 
L(a, R1) = H(a, p1) for all i E N. 
Since the F-minimal profiles for Fa can.be parameterized by p E 
(Em)n, and each individual need only specify lower contour sets for 
himself and his neighbor, we can define a strategy set satisfying the 
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conditions of Mechanism III as follows: For i E N, define 
Ti = A x Em x Em x N 
T 
We write ti (ai,pi,qi,ni) and t =(ti•· .. ,t0) for typical elements of 
Ti and T, respectively. For any t ET define s(t) = (s1(t), ... ,s0(t)) 
by setting si (t) = (ai ,Ai/ Bi, ni), where Ai = H(ai, Pi) and Bi = 
H(ai,qi). The set S = s(T) so constructed satisfies (5. 4) and (5. 2). 
Hence, since Fa is onto, S satisfies the conditions required for 
Mechanism III (see comment after Theorem 3). Thus, g: S(T) 4 A 
implements Fa. The game form can be defined directly on T instead of 
on S by defining h: T 4 A by h(t) = g(s(t)). It is immediate from 
Theorem 2 that h implements Fa. 
In this example, as explained in Section 5, above, the strategy 
space can be further reduced to A x Em x Em by partitioning Em into n 
non empty regions, say (Di Ji EN• and then setting ni(ai,Ai) = j <-+Pi € 
Di. 
�xample 2: The constrained Walrasian correspondence. 
An example in Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite [1984) shows that 
the Walrasian correspondence does not satisfy monotonicity when the 
final allocation is on the boundary. Hence, the usual Walrasian 
correspondence is not Nash implementable. However, they connstruct a 
"constrained Walrasian correspondence" which is implementable. This 
correspondence is a superset of the Walrasian correspondence, and the 
two are equal on non boundary points. 
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For each i E N, let Zi � EL be a closed convex set, bounded from 
below, containing the origin. Thus, Zi represents the consumption set 
(in net trades) for agent i. Let z = rrifN zi, and let 6L be the 
L dimensional price simplex. Then, set 
A= (z E Z: �iEN zi = 0)
Ri = (Ri c AX A: Ri = R� n(A X A) for some R� � Z x Z, 
where R; is continuous, convex, monotonic, 
and selfish) 
R = Ili EN Ri. 
We then define the constrained Walrasian correspondence, 2 Fw:R 44 A by 
Fw(R) = (z E A: 3 p E 6L such that V z' E A and V i € N, 
p z; � 0 implies z' E L(z, Ri)} 
It follows from standard results (e.g., Debreu [1959)) that Fw is 
always non-empty. It also follows easily that Fw satisfies 
monotonicity and NVP. So Mechanism I can be used to implement Fw. 
However, again, Mechanism III can yield substantial strategy space 
reduction. For p E 6L, write Hi(p) = (z' EA : p z; � 0 ). Then, it 
can be verified that Fw is F-closed, and that for any z E A, R E R is 
F-minimal for z only if 3 p E 6L, with p · zi = 0 for all i, satisfying 
L(z,Ri) = Hi(p) for all i EN. 
Thus, the F-minimal profiles for Fw can be parameterized by p E 
6L , As in Example 1, we can use this parameterization to define a 
strategy set satisfying the conditions for Mechanism III. Set 
Ti = A X 6L X N 
T = rriEN Ti, 
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and write ti= (ai, pi, ni) and t =(ti, ... , tn) for typical elements of 
Ti and T, respectively. For any t e T, define s(t) = (s1(t), ... , sn(t)) 
by setting si(t) = (a1, A1, Bi, ni), where Ai= Hi(p1) and Bi= Hi+1(pi) 
if Pi · zi = 0 and otherwise Ai= Hi(p) and Bi = �. The set S = s(T) 
so constructed satisfies conditions (5.1) and (5.2), so S satisfies the 
conditions for Mechanism III. Hence, g: S (T)-+-+ A implements Fw. Again, 
the game form can be defined directly on T instead of on S by defining 
h: T --> A by h(t) 
implements Fw . 
g (s(t)). It is immediate from Theorem 2 that h 
As in Example 1 noted above, the strategy space can be further 
reduced to A x  8L by partitioning 8L into n regions, say (DilieN• and 
then setting ni(ai , A1) = j <---> p1 e DJ. 
�xample 3: The constrained Lindahl correspondence. 
For each i e N, let Z1 S Em x EL be a closed convex set, bounded 
from below, with non empty interior, and containing the origin. Let z 
= IIieN Zi, and let 8m, 8L, and 8m+L be the m, L, and m+L dimensional 
price sirnplices. Set 81 = 8m+L for each i, and 8n = II1eN 81• Elements 
of Z1 and 81 are denoted z1 = (z}, zf) and p1 = (p}, pf) respectively, 
where z} €Em, zr € E1, PI € 8m, and Pt € 81. Elements of z and 8 are 
denoted z = (z1, ... , zn) and p = (p1, ... , pn), respectively. Write z = 
hleN zi, and P = hleN Pi/n. Let Y c Em x EL be a closed, convex cone, 
with typical elements (x, y), satisfying conditions B.l - B.5 of Foley 
[1970]. Define 
A = (z e Z: z} z} for all i, j e N, and z e Y) 
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8 = (p e 8n: Pt= pj for all i, j e NJ 
Ri = (Ri c AX A: Ri = R�n(A x A) for some R� S Z x Z, 
where R� is continuous, convex, monotonic, 
and selfish) 
R = Ili €N Ri . 
We then define the constrained Lindahl correspondence, FL: R-+-+ A by 
FL(R) = (z e A: 3 p e 8 such that V z' A, p · z' � p · z, 
and V i e N, Pi 
z' e L (z, Ri)l 
z� � 0 implies 
It follows from Foley [1970] that FL is always non-empty.3 It also
follows easily that FL satisfies monotonicity and NVP. So Mechanism I 
can be used to implement FL. However, again, Mechanism III can yield
substantial strategy space reduction. For p e 8m+L, and i € N, write 
Hi(p) = (z' e A: p z� � 0). It can be verified that FL is F-closed, 
and that for any z €A, R e  R is F-minimal for z only if 3 p e 8m+L, 
with p1 • z1 = 0 for all i, satisfying L(z, Ri)
Thus, the F-minimal profiles for FL can be parameterized by p € 8. As
before, we can use this to define a strategy space satisfying the 
conditions for Mechanism III. Define 
Ti = A x 8L X 8m X 8m X N 
T = Ili €N Ti ' 
and write ti= (ai, pi, qi, ri, ni) and t = (�i• · .. , tn) for typical 
elements of Ti and T, respectively. For any t e T define s(t) = 
(s1(t), ... , sn(t)) by setting si(t) = (ai, Ai, Bi, ni), where Ai 
Hi (pi, qi) and Bi = Hi+l (pi, ri). If (pi, qi) · zi = 0 and Ai = H1 (pi, qi) 
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and Bi = � otherwise. It can be checked that the set S = s(T) so 
defined satisfies (5. 1) and (5. 2). Hence, the conditions for 
Mechanism III are met, and g: S(T) �A implements FL. The game form 
can then be defined directly on T instead of on S by defining h: T � A 
by h(t) = g(s(t)). It is immediate from Theorem 2 that h implements F1• 
As before, the strategy space can be further reduced to A x �L x 
�m X �m by partitioning �L into n regions, say {DilieN• and then 
setting ni (ai , Ai)= j +->Pi e DJ. 
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* 
FOOTNOTES 
This paper was inspired by Tatsuyoshi Saijo's dissertation. I� 
greatly indebted to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo 
for some very helpful discussions. I acknowledge support of NSF 
grant No. SES 8208184. 
1. The basic idea of a Tweed ring is illustrated by Thomas Nast,
Harpers Weekly, August 19, 1871, and reprinted in Morton Keller
[1968], p 118.
2. Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite actually use a different definition
of a constrained Walrasian equilibrium, in which individuals
maximize over their own consumption sets subject to a constraint on 
total endowment. However, with selfish preferences, that 
definition is equivalent to the one given here. 
3. Foley makes an additional assumption outlawing allocations that are 
on the boundary of the constraint set (his assumption (C.l). 
However, this condition is only required for the first half of his 
paper, and is not required in his existence proof. (In fact, the 
existence theorem is incorrect with this assumption.) Hence, we do 
not make it here. 
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